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THE UNTAPPED POTENTIAL OF THE FAIR HOUSING ACT IN ADDRESSING 
AGGRESSIVE ENFORCEMENT OF “WALKING WHILE BLACK OR BROWN” 
ROBERTO CONCEPCIÓN, Jr. 
What may arouse hostility is not the fact of aggressive patrol but its indiscriminate use so 
that it comes to be regarded not as crime control but as a new method of racial harassment. 
KERNER COMMISSION REPORT (1968)1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine being sent to the corner store by your mother to buy ketchup for a dinner of 
chicken and French fries. On your way back you see two plainclothes officers with badges in front 
of your building and three uniformed officers across the street. When you reach your building, the 
two plainclothes officers stop you and begin asking you questions, including where you are coming 
from, where you are headed, and what you have in your bag. After answering that you have ketchup 
in your bag, one of the officers asks you to raise your hands and then asks you what you have in 
your pockets. The officer starts to frisk you, first shaking your pockets, then putting a hand in your 
left pocket, then patting your arms down. Once he finishes, the officer asks you for your ID and 
takes your name down on a notepad. The other officer looks in your bag and inspects the ketchup. 
The officers ask you for your apartment number and ring the bell. They then ask your mother 
through the intercom to “please come down and identify your son.” Your mother runs down the 
stairs, thinking you are dead or hurt, and collapses on the steps when she sees you standing by the 
officers, uninjured. One of the officers approaches your mother, laughing, and hands her the 
ketchup. The officers then let you go.2 After returning to your apartment, reality sets in: the police 
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1  REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 161 (1968) [hereinafter “KERNER 
COMMISSION REPORT”]. 
2  Such was the experience of J.G., a black seventeen year old who was a named plaintiff in Ligon v. City of 
New York, a class action lawsuit challenging the New York Police Department’s (“NYPD’s”) stop-and-frisk policies and 
practices in and around thousands of private residential buildings around the City of New York enrolled in the Trespass 
Affidavit Program, also known as “Operation Clean Halls.” 925 F.Supp.2d 478, 483-85 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). J.G.’s experience 
of being suspected of trespassing for simply entering his apartment building is not an aberration. See NEW YORK LAWYERS 
FOR THE PUBLIC INTEREST, NO PLACE LIKE HOME: A PRELIMINARY REPORT ON POLICE INTERACTIONS WITH PUBLIC 
HOUSING RESIDENTS IN NEW YORK CITY 2 (Sept. 2008) (“Many residents report frequent police abuse of authority, 
particularly around the enforcement of trespass laws. For example in [certain public housing units operated by the New York 
City Public Housing Authority] approximately 30% of the residents surveyed reported they had been charged with 
trespassing, despite the fact that they lived there. Approximately 70% of those surveyed at the Thomas Jefferson Houses 
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stopped you for “walking while black (or brown).”3 
This is the reality of “stop-and-frisk” policing. The story described above is not an isolated 
incident, nor is the racial identity of J.G. coincidental. Blacks and Latinos, particularly those in low-
income neighborhoods, are subjected to this policing tool that, as Michelle Alexander writes, 
“would result in public outrage and scandal if committed in middle-class white neighborhoods.”4 
But this reality is far from new. In 1968, the United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio 
announced the constitutional standards for stop-and-frisk practices, and acknowledged “[t]he 
wholesale harassment [of racial minorities] by certain elements of the police community.”5 Citing 
the findings of the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, the 
Terry Court wrote: 
The President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice 
found that “in many communities, field interrogations are a major source of 
friction between the police and minority groups.” It was reported that the friction 
caused by “misuse of field interrogations” increases “as more police departments 
adopt ‘aggressive patrol’ in which officers are encouraged routinely to stop and 
question persons on the street who are unknown to them, who are suspicious, or 
whose purpose for being abroad is not readily evident.” While the frequency with 
which “frisking” forms a part of field interrogation practice varies tremendously 
with the locale, the objective of the interrogation, and the particular officer, it 
cannot help but be a severely exacerbating factor in police-community tensions. 
This is particularly true in situations where the “stop and frisk” of youths or 
minority group members is “motivated by the officers’ perceived need to 
maintain the power image of the beat officer, an aim sometimes accomplished by 
humiliating anyone who attempts to undermine police control of the streets.”6 
Supporters of the aggressive use of stop-and-frisk as a proactive policing tool perceive a 
much different reality. For them, stop-and-frisk is a valuable crime-fighting technique7 that 
                                                                
reported that they had been repeatedly stopped by police officers when simply coming and going around their homes.”); cf. 
Julie K. Brown, In Miami Gardens, Store Video Catches Cops in the Act, MIAMI HERALD (Nov. 22, 2013) (discussing how 
a twenty-eight year old black male received more than sixty citations for trespassing, most of which were issued at his place 
of employment), http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/11/21/v-fullstory/3769823/in-miami-gardens-store-video-
catches.html. 
3  See generally Clyde Haberman, A Shooting, and Shooting from the Hip, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1999, at B1; 
Editorial, Walking While Black in New York, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2013, at A16; George Yancy, Op-Ed., Walking While 
Black in the “White Gaze,” N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2013, 7:00 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com 
/2013/09/01/walking-while-black-in-the-white-gaze/; David A. Harris, “Driving While Black” and All Other Traffic 
Offenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544, 546 & n.10 (1997); DAVID 
A. HARRIS, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, DRIVING WHILE BLACK: RACIAL PROFILING ON OUR NATION’S HIGHWAYS 
(1999), available at https://www.aclu.org/racial-justice/driving-while-black-racial-profiling-our-nations-highways. 
4  MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 96 
(2010); see also id. at 120-24. 
5  392 U.S. 1, 14 (1968); see discussion infra Part II.a. 
6  Id. at 14 n.11 (quoting PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF 
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 183-84 (1967)). 
7  See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW YORK STATE, REPORT ON THE NEW YORK CITY 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol17/iss4/2
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disproportionately affects racial minorities only because racial minorities are disproportionately 
represented among criminal offenders.8 Forty-five years after Terry, stop-and-frisk remains a major 
source of tension between the police and minority communities. 
Despite efforts to reform local police departments, and despite the availability of federal 
legislative measures to challenge discriminatory stop-and-frisk practices in problematic 
departments, the abusive use of stop-and-frisk persists in the United States.9 In order to address 
seemingly unresolvable tensions, this Article argues that these practices should be challenged by 
                                                                
POLICE DEPARTMENT’S “STOP & FRISK” PRACTICES [hereinafter “NY ATTORNEY GENERAL 1999 STOP & FRISK REPORT”] 
45, 56 (1999) (describing the role of stop-and-frisk in furthering the New York City Police Department’s goals of “order 
maintenance, deterrence, crime prevention, and a direct attack on gun violence”), available at 
http://www.ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/pdfs/bureaus/civil_rights/stp_frsk.pdf. But see Richard Rosenfeld & Robert 
Fornango, The Impact of Police Stops on Precinct Robbery and Burglary Rates in New York City, 2003-2010, 31 JUST. Q., 
117-18 (2014) (finding few significant effects of stop, question, and frisk on robbery and burglary rates) (“We cannot 
conclude from the current investigation that SQF has no impact on crime in New York. But we can be more certain that, if 
there is an impact, it is so localized and dissipates so rapidly that it fails to register in annual precinct crime rates, much less 
the decade-long citywide crime reductions that public officials have attributed to the policy.”); see also Jennifer Peltz, Stop 
and Frisks Down in NYC; Bloomberg Cites Crime Drop But Critics Say It’s Reverse, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 28, 2013, 
3:45 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/28/stop-and-frisks-nyc_n_3832082.html (citing lower crime rates in 
New York City in 2013, despite a decrease in street stops). 
The effectiveness of a law enforcement tool, though, has no place in judging the constitutionality of police behavior. As the 
Supreme Court recently observed, “[T]he enshrinement of constitutional rights necessarily takes certain policy choices off 
the table”—and the unconstitutional use of stop-and-frisk as policing tool is one of them. District of Columbia v. Heller, 
554 U.S. 570, 676 (2008); see also Benjamin Weiser & Joseph Goldstein, Mayor Says New York City Will Settle Suits on 
Frisk Tactics, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2014, at A1 (recounting Police Commissioner William Bratton’s statement, “We will 
not break the law to enforce the law,” made during a press conference at which New York City’s Mayor Bill de Blasio 
announced his intention to withdraw the appeal of the stop-and-frisk litigation). 
8  See, e.g., DAVID A. HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE: WHY RACIAL PROFILING CANNOT WORK 73-74 (2002) 
(compiling the opinions of police officers and a former Drug Enforcement Administration agent, among others). In a federal 
class action lawsuit challenging the New York City Police Department’s stop-and-frisk practices, Judge Shira Scheindlin of 
the Southern District of New York rejected the testimony of the city’s experts that the race of crime suspects was the 
appropriate benchmark for examining racial bias in stops. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F.Supp.2d 540, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013). The district court recognized that the city and its highest officials believed that blacks and Hispanics should be 
stopped at the same rate as their proportion of the local criminal suspect population, but the court found the city’s reasoning 
flawed because the stopped population was overwhelmingly innocent, not criminal. See id. 
9  Although instances of police brutality—the torturing of black security guard Abner Louima in Brooklyn 
with a broomstick, the firing of forty-one bullets at African immigrant Amadous Diallo in the Bronx, and the videotaped 
beating of Rodney King in Los Angeles—garner the most media attention, they represent only a fraction of unlawful conduct 
in which some police officers engage. See Kami Chavis Simmons, Cooperative Federalism and Police Reform: Using 
Congressional Spending Power to Promote Police Accountability, 62 ALA. L. REV. 351, 360 (2011); Michael Powell, In a 
Volatile City, a Stern Line on Race and Politics, N.Y. TIMES. July 22, 2007, at A1; Patterns of Police Violence, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 18, 2001, at A22; see also NY ATTORNEY GENERAL 1999 STOP & FRISK REPORT, supra note 7, at 4 (“Many of the 
complaints [received by the Attorney General], if not most, revolved around lower-level police involvement in the everyday 
lives of minority residents, rather than celebrated cases of extreme abuse.”). Police misconduct, however, includes a broader 
range of police practices that infringe on the civil rights of individuals where unconstitutional racial profiling is just one 
example. Id. at 360-61. An emerging consensus among police experts considers misconduct by individual officers the result 
of inadequate management policies and practices (the “rotten barrel” theory), as opposed to the result of bad individual 
officers (the “rotten apple” theory). Samuel Walker & Morgan Macdonald, An Alternative Remedy for Police Misconduct: 
A Model State “Pattern or Practice” Statute, 19 GEO. MASON. U. C.R. L.J. 479, 483-84 (2009). 
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relying on a statute already on the books, but one which traditionally has not been relied on in this 
context: the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”),10 which prohibits racial discrimination in the provision of 
municipal services in connection with the sale or rental of a dwelling.11 
This Article proceeds in several parts. Part II of this Article provides an overview of the 
legal terrain of stop-and-frisk. It summarizes the constitutional standards for stop-and-frisk, and 
discusses how this highly discretionary police practice has resulted in the racial profiling of 
pedestrians on a national scale. Part II also briefly describes the traditional mechanisms for 
addressing police misconduct and shares common criticisms of those measures. Part III explores 
the viability of relying on the FHA’s disparate impact theory to challenge the overly aggressive 
provision of police services in minority neighborhoods where intentional discrimination cannot be 
demonstrated. It does so first by reviewing the legal standard for a disparate impact claim and then 
by analyzing how courts have treated claims relating to the discriminatory provision of police 
services. Part III discusses how a plaintiff must proceed in using the FHA to challenge a police 
department’s stop-and-frisk practices under the disparate impact theory, and notes the advantages 
of doing so. Part IV concludes that an FHA disparate impact claim represents a promising means 
of sustainably remedying discriminatory police practices in minority neighborhoods. 
I. RACIAL PROFILING IN PEDESTRIAN STOPS AND FRISKS 
A. The Constitutional Standards for the Practice of Stop-and-Frisk 
The Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment,12 
provides: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”13 The United States Supreme Court 
has affirmed time and time again that “the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 
‘reasonableness.’”14 The Supreme Court has held that under the Fourth Amendment, police are 
constitutionally permitted to “stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the 
officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity ‘may be 
afoot,’ even if the officer lacks probable cause.”15 Such an investigative detention is now commonly 
referred to as a “Terry stop.”16 
Whether a Terry stop has occurred depends on “whether a reasonable person would feel 
free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.”17 The relevant inquiry 
                                                                
10  42 U.S.C.A. § 3601 (2013). 
11  Id. § 3604(b). 
12  Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 650 (1961). 
13  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
14  Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006). 
15  United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). 
16  See, e.g., Floyd, 959 F.Supp.2d at 565. 
17  Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436 (1991). But see Samuel R. Gross & Debra Livingston, Racial 
Profiling Under Attack, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1424 (2002) (arguing that “[t]he constitutional regulation of stops and 
searches is based in part on the premise that the average citizen feels free to ignore an armed police officer who asks for 
identification, or to look in the trunk, and that the nearly universal compliance with such demands is voluntary. . . [which] 
is a convenient fiction even under ordinary circumstances . . . .”). 
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is “whether, taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the police 
conduct would ‘have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the 
police presence and go about his business.’”18 In order for a Terry stop to comply with the Fourth 
Amendment, the stop must be based on a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity “may be 
afoot.”19 The police officer must have a “reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person has been, 
is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity.”20 
The Supreme Court has recognized that a police officer making a Terry stop “should not 
be denied the opportunity to protect himself from attack by a hostile suspect.”21 For this reason, “a 
law enforcement officer, for his own protection and safety, may conduct a patdown to find weapons 
that he reasonably believes or suspects are then in the possession of the person he has accosted.”22 
In order for a police officer to proceed from a stop to a frisk, the officer must have “reason to believe 
that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual.”23 However, “[n]othing in Terry can be 
understood to allow a generalized ‘cursory search for weapons’ or indeed, any search whatever for 
anything but weapons.”24 
B. Racial Profiling: A National Problem 
One scholar has commented that, through Terry, the Supreme Court gave its “legal 
blessing” to stop-and-frisk, thereby legitimizing a highly discretionary police practice.25 This 
discretion includes where and whom to target.26 Racial profiling27 studies have confirmed that 
police exercise their discretion regarding whom to stop and search in a discriminatory fashion.28 
Provided below is a sample of the findings in these studies: 
 In New Jersey, data revealed that less than 15 percent of all drivers on the New Jersey 
Turnpike were black, yet black motorists constituted more than 35 percent of those 
stopped and more than 73 percent of those arrested. This disparity did not result from 
blacks violating the traffic laws at higher rates. Instead, the data showed that blacks 
                                                                
18  Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437 (quoting Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 569 (1988)). 
19  Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. 
20  United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 702 (1983) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 32-33). 
21  Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 24). 
22  Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93 (1979) (citing Adams, 407 U.S. at 146). 
23  Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. 
24  Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 93-94. 
25  HARRIS, supra note 8 at 39; see also Alexander, supra note 4, at 121. Harris has also observed that 
following Terry, the Supreme Court addressed stop-and-frisk only on a handful of occasions, for the most part expanding 
the scope of police discretion. HARRIS, supra note 8 at 39. 
26  ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 121. 
27  The term “racial profiling” can be defined as occurring “whenever a law enforcement officer questions, 
stops, arrests, searches, or otherwise investigates a person because the officer believes that members of that person’s racial 
or ethnic group are more likely than the population at large to commit the sort of crime the officer is investigating.” Gross 
& Livingston, supra note 17, at 1415. For somewhat different definitions of racial profiling, see id. at 1416 n.6. 
28  For an in-depth review of these studies, see HARRIS, supra note 8, at 53-69. 
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and whites violated traffic laws at the same rate.29 A later study conducted by the 
Attorney General of New Jersey revealed that the overwhelming majority of searches 
conducted of motor vehicles (77.2 percent) were of those driven by blacks and 
Hispanics.30 
 In Maryland, blacks constituted 17 percent of the drivers along I-95, but 72 percent of 
those stopped and searched.31 And even though only 21 percent of all drivers were 
racial minorities (Latinos, Asians, and blacks), those groups constituted nearly 80 
percent of those stopped and searched.32 
 In Volusia County, Florida, a local newspaper obtained 148 hours of video footage 
documenting almost 1,100 roadside stops conducted by deputies. Only five percent of 
the highway drivers were black or Latino, yet blacks and Latinos constituted more 
than 70 percent of those stopped and more than 80 percent of those whose cars were 
searched.33 
 In Illinois, state troopers assigned to a drug interdiction program called Operation 
Valkyrie singled out Latino motorists. Although Latinos comprised less than eight 
percent of the Illinois population and took fewer than three percent of the personal 
vehicle trips in the state, they accounted for about 30 percent of the motorists stopped 
by drug interdiction officers for discretionary offenses such as driving one to four 
miles over the speed limit. Latinos were less likely to have illegal contraband in their 
vehicles than whites.34 
 In Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, racial minorities constituted approximately 56 percent 
of the city’s population, but almost 86 percent of those stopped on one particular week 
and more than 71 percent on another week.35 
 In Oakland, California, blacks were approximately twice as likely as whites to be 
stopped and three times as likely to be searched.36 
                                                                
29  Id. at 53-56; see also State v. Soto, 734 A.2d 350 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996). 
30  OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, INTERIM REPORT OF THE STATE 
POLICE REVIEW TEAM REGARDING ALLEGATIONS OF RACIAL PROFILING 27 (1999), available at 
www.state.nj.us/lps/intm_419.pdf. 
31  HARRIS, supra note 8, at 61-62. 
32  ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 131. 
33  Jeff Brazil & Steve Berry, Color of Driver Is Key to Stops in I-95 Videos, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 23, 
1992, at A1; David A. Harris, Driving While Black and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual 
Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544, 561-62 (1997). 
34 See HARRIS, supra note 3. 
35  Id. 
36  ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 132. 
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 In Akron and Toledo, Ohio, blacks were more than two times as likely to be ticketed 
as all other drivers. In Franklin County and Dayton, blacks were 1.8 times as likely to 
be ticketed as other drivers.37 
The alarmingly consistent pattern of racial profiling illustrated by these studies is not 
limited to the traffic context. Racial profiling in pedestrian stops has also been the subject of study.38 
As David Harris writes, “What traffic stops are to profiling on the highways, stops and frisks are to 
profiling on the streets.”39 A study commissioned by the Attorney General of New York, for 
example, found that black pedestrians were six times more likely to be stopped than whites in New 
York City.40 Similarly, Latino pedestrians were four times more likely to be stopped than whites.41 
However, stops of blacks and Latinos were less likely to result in arrests than those of whites.42 
Although the NYPD claimed its stop-and-frisk program was critical to removing guns from the 
street, only 2.5 percent of the stops made on suspicion of weapons possession effectuated by the 
now-defunct Street Crime Unit—an elite unit of plainclothes officers tasked with recovering illegal 
firearms—resulted in an arrest for weapons possession.43 Presumably, this is because most of the 
individuals stopped did not have any weapons. 
Rather than respond to the troubling data by, for instance, questioning the effectiveness of 
its stop-and-frisk practices or engaging in a constructive dialogue with the community to assuage 
their serious concerns, the NYPD increased the number of pedestrian stops significantly, turning a 
blind eye to the disproportionate and ineffectual stop rates of racial minorities. Between January 
2004 and June 2012, the NYPD conducted over 4.4 million Terry stops, with the number of stops 
per year rising sharply from 314,000 in 2004 to a high of 686,000 in 2011.44 In 52 percent of the 
4.4 million stops, the person stopped was black;45 in 31 percent, the person was Latino.46 The 
disproportionate stop rates were not attributable to blacks and Latinos engaging in illegal activity 
at higher rates than whites. In fact, the seizure rate for weapons and other illegal contraband was 
higher with white pedestrians (1.4% and 2.3%, respectively) than black (1% and 1.8%, respectively) 
                                                                
37  HARRIS, supra note 8, at 68. The calculations were based on whether a black person was more likely to be 
ticketed than a white, Latino, or Asian person. Because other minorities, particularly Latinos, complained of being targeted 
for ticketing, the calculations understated the scope of the problem. Id. 
38  See generally HARRY G. LEVINE ET AL., TARGETING BLACKS FOR MARIJUANA: POSSESSION ARRESTS OF 
AFRICAN AMERICANS IN CALIFORNIA, 2004-2008 (2010); HARRY G. LEVINE & DEBORAH PETERSON SMALL, NEW YORK 
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, MARIJUANA ARREST CRUSADE: RACIAL BIAS AND POLICE POLICY IN NEW YORK CITY, 1997-2007 
(2008); Andrew Gelman et al., An Analysis of the New York City Police Department’s “Stop-and-Frisk” Policy in the 
Context of Claims of Racial Bias, 102 J. AM. STATISTICAL ASS’N 813 (2007). 
39  HARRIS, supra note 8, at 38. 
40  NY ATTORNEY GENERAL 1999 STOP & FRISK REPORT, supra note 7, at 95, 111 (1999). 
41  Id. 
42  Id. 
43  Id. at 53, 53 n.32, 58, 117 n.23. 
44  Floyd, 959 F.Supp.2d at 558. 
45  Id. 
46  Id. 
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or Latino pedestrians (1.1% and 1.7%, respectively).47 The significant number of total pedestrian 
stops does not reflect rampant illegal activity. Only 6 percent of all stops resulted in an arrest and 
another 6 percent resulted in a summons.48 The remaining 88 percent resulted in no further 
enforcement action, suggesting that the NYPD stopped many innocent New Yorkers.49 
The ramifications of racial profiling, both in pedestrian stops and in general, are extensive. 
Patterns of police misconduct have a financial impact on municipalities and local police 
departments due to the costs of litigation and settlement.50 For example, one group estimated that 
nationally, from January to December of 2010, more than $346 million was spent on misconduct-
related civil judgments and settlements.51 In New York City between 1994 and 2000, the 
municipality faced damages amounting to $180 million in police misconduct cases.52 Similarly, 
during the 1990s, Detroit paid $124 million in lawsuits related to police misconduct.53 According 
to one scholar, the evidence suggests that any deterrent effect of damages remains weak and that 
police departments regard civil litigation and monetary damages as “not [their] problem” or simply 
part of the “cost of doing business.”54 
In addition to the financial repercussions of police misconduct, there is significant 
evidence that this misconduct “negatively impacts the perceived legitimacy of police officers and 
                                                                
47  Id.  
48  Id. For a report analyzing the extent to which stop-and-frisk in New York City yields convictions, see 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW YORK STATE, REPORT ON ARRESTS ARISING FROM THE NEW YORK CITY 
POLICE DEPARTMENT’S STOP-AND-FRISK PRACTICES 1-2 (2013), available at 
http://www.ag.ny.gov/pdfs/OAG_REPORT_ON_SQF_PRACTICES_NOV_2013.pdf (finding, among other things, that 
close to half of all arrests that result from the stop-and-frisk program result in a criminal conviction or violation; less than 
one in four arrests (1.5% of all stops) resulted in a jail or prison sentence; one in fifty arrests (about 0.1% of all stops) led to 
a conviction for a crime of violence; one in fifty arrests (about 0.1% of all stops) led to a conviction for possession of a 
weapon; almost one in four (24.7%) arrests were dismissed before arraignment or resulted in a non-criminal charge; and 
racial disparities in stops were found through arrest, disposition, and sentencing). 
49  Floyd, 959 F.Supp.2d at 573; cf. JOSÉ LUIS MORÍN, LATINO/A RIGHTS AND JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES: 
PERSPECTIVES AND APPROACHES 129 (2d ed. 2005) (“[L]aw enforcement officers too often view the hip-hop fashions, 
tattoos, and other forms of expression currently in vogue among Latino/a youth—whether or not they actually belong to a 
gang—as synonymous with crime.”). The city argued, in part, that many stops effectuated by the NYPD interrupt a crime 
from occurring. Floyd, 959 F.Supp.2d at 575. The city, however, failed to offer evidence at trial of “a single stop that was 
based on reasonable suspicion, and . . . prevented the commission of a crime, but . . . did not result in probable cause for an 
arrest.” Id. The court found it “highly implausible” that successful preventive stops took place frequently enough such that 
in 88% of the NYPD’s 4.4 million stops, the suspicion giving rise to the stop was properly placed. Id. 
50  Simmons, supra note 9, at 366. 
51  CATO INSTITUTE, 2010 NATIONAL POLICE MISCONDUCT STATISTICS AND REPORTING PROJECT POLICE 
MISCONDUCT STATISTICAL REPORT (2010), available at http://www.policemisconduct.net/statistics/2010-annual-report. 
This figure excludes sealed settlements, court costs, and attorney fees. Id. Of the 6,613 law enforcement officers involved 
in reported allegations of misconduct that met the Project’s criteria for tracking purposes, 1,575 (23.8%) were involved in 
excessive force reports—the most prominent type of report. Id. 
52  David A. Harris, How Accountability-Based Policing Can Reinforce—or Replace—the Fourth Amendment 
Exclusionary Rule, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 149, 156 (2009). 
53  Id. 
54  Id. at 157. 
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increases police-community tensions.”55 When friction between the police and the community 
exists, it becomes difficult for the two to forge partnerships aimed at dealing with crime, thereby 
undermining the community-policing model that has become popular in the United States.56 
C. Inadequate Solutions to a National Problem 
Despite that police misconduct is a national issue,57 the federal government has historically 
exhibited reluctance in investigating and prosecuting local law enforcement officers for misconduct 
at the first instance, preferring to serve as a “backstop.”58 Although state governments have retained 
primary responsibility for regulating their officers, states have failed to prosecute officers for 
misconduct.59 Generally, the federal government uses tools to combat police misconduct only when 
the states fail to act.60 
Commentators have observed that, although Congress has recognized the need for federal 
authority to address police misconduct, federal legislative measures thus far have fallen short of 
precipitating widespread institutional reform within police departments.61 First, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
permits victims of police misconduct to bring civil lawsuits in federal court for violations of their 
constitutional rights.62 Critics of § 1983 argue that it is an ineffective tool to remedy police 
                                                                
55  Simmons, supra note 9, at 367; see HARRIS, supra note 8, at 52 (observing that civil rights activists in the 
1960s and beyond “regarded stops and frisks as a major source of tension between police and minorities in inner cities”); 
ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 122 (explaining how, in ghetto communities, “many black youth automatically ‘assume the 
position’ when a patrol car pulls up, knowing full well that they will be detained and frisked no matter what”); KERNER 
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 164 (describing the use of stop-and-frisk as having “the potential for becoming a 
major source of friction between police and minority groups”). 
56  Simmons, supra note 9, at 368; see also Walker & Macdonald, supra note 9, at 483 (stating that “[c]itizen 
cooperation, in turn, is diminished by patterns of abusive police conduct that undermines public trust”); cf. Morín, supra 
note 49, at 125 (“Discrimination, segregation, ‘frustrated hopes,’ the ‘legitimization of violence,’ and ‘powerlessness’—
terms used by the Kerner Commission to identify the basic causes for the disturbances of the 1960s in places such as Los 
Angeles and New York—are words that, in many ways, are still applicable to the circumstances under which many 
Latinos/as, African Americans, and other people of color live within U.S. society.”) (citation omitted). 
57  See generally Simmons, supra note 9, at 353 (noting that police brutality has long been an issue within 
American law enforcement agencies).  
58  Id. at 368 n.79. 
59  Id. at 368-69. 
60  Id. at 369. 
61  Id. For a broader review of the major strategies for police reform, the positive achievements of these 
strategies, and their limitations to effectuating organizational change, see Walker & Macdonald, supra note 9, at 489-500 
(discussing self-regulation, constitutional litigation, tort litigation, criminal prosecution of police officers, Blue Ribbon 
Commissions, and citizen oversight of the police). 
62  42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 provides: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . 
. . , subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party 
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .(2013). 
For examples of § 1983 lawsuits alleging violations of Fourth and/or Fourteenth Amendment violations on the part of a 
police department, see, e.g., Daniels v. City of New York, 198 F.R.D. 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Floyd, 959 F.Supp.2d 668 
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misconduct because municipalities generally indemnify police officers, and more broadly, this 
option rarely addresses “flawed management, policies, or patterns of abuse.”63 Second, police 
officers may face criminal charges for engaging in police misconduct.64 However, federal 
prosecutions—like state criminal prosecutions—are uncommon.65 Lastly, under 42 U.S.C. § 14141, 
the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) can seek injunctive and declaratory relief against local law 
enforcement agencies where a “pattern or practice” of constitutional violations exists.66 The use of 
§ 14141 has been recognized as an important tool to precipitate institutional reform within police 
departments,67 in large part because it focuses on the root of police misconduct rather than the bad 
deeds of individual officers. There are, however, a number of compelling critiques to this particular 
reform model.68 For example, one critique is that § 14141 lacks an “overall philosophy that should 
guide the delivery of police services.”69 For this reason, many of the consent decrees and 
memoranda of agreement the DOJ has entered into with the targeted police departments lack a 
mechanism to include community members as part of the reform.70 In addition, Congress failed to 
                                                                
(S.D.N.Y. 2013); Davis v. City of New York, 902 F.Supp.2d 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); and Ligon, 925 F.Supp.2d 478 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013). 
63  Simmons, supra note 9, at 369-70 (citation omitted); see also Walker & Macdonald, supra note 9, at 493 
(“[C]onstitutional litigation over police practices necessarily involves discrete aspects of policing (for example, search and 
seizure or interrogations), which ignores the impact of the larger organizational culture on police behavior. A department 
may have a state of the art policy on reporting use of force incidents, for example, but the informal culture might tolerate or 
even encourage officers not to comply fully with the policy.”). 
64  18 U.S.C. § 242 (2012) makes it a crime for a person acting “under color of any law, statute, ordinance, 
regulation, or custom, [to] willfully subject[] any person in any State . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States . . . .” Additionally, 18 U.S.C. § 241 (2012) 
makes it unlawful for “two or more persons [to] conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person . . . in the free 
exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because 
of his having so exercised the same.” But see Walker & Macdonald, supra note 9, at 496 (“[M]uch police conduct, including 
the use of force without injury, racial, ethnic or sexual slurs, does not rise to the level of criminal conduct.”). 
65  Simmons, supra note 9, at 370. 
66  42 U.S.C.A. § 14141 (2012) permits the Attorney General to file a lawsuit to eliminate “a pattern or practice 
of conduct by law enforcement officers . . . that deprives persons of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by 
the Constitution or laws of the United States.” DOJ has entered into consent decrees to reform police misconduct in dozens 
of law enforcement agencies nationwide, including the Los Angeles Police Department, the East Haven Police Department, 
the New Orleans Police Department, the Detroit Police Department, and the Seattle Police Department. See Special 
Litigation Section Cases and Matters, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/findsettle.php#police (last visited June 8, 2014). The settlements typically involve a set 
of the following mandated reforms: improved use of force policies, early intervention systems, improved citizen complaint 
systems, and improved officer training. Walker & Macdonald, supra note 9, at 487. For an in-depth review of the 
implementation of § 14141 and the impact of “pattern or practice” litigation on local police departments, see Walker & 
Macdonald, supra note 9, at 502-536. 
67  See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note 8, at 201-02. 
68  Simmons, supra note 9, at 373. 
69  Id.  
70  Id. One notable exception to this criticism is the Cincinnati Collaborative Agreement—entered into by the 
Cincinnati Black United Front, the American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio Foundation, Inc., the City of Cincinnati, and the 
Fraternal Order of Police—which, among other things, included “outreach to the entire Cincinnati community through eight 
stakeholder groups: African-Americans, social service and religious organizations, businesses and philanthropic groups, 
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include a private right of action under § 14141 that would authorize citizens to initiate lawsuits. 
Because § 14141 creates an “exclusively executive-run . . . regime,” critics have argued that 
enforcement may be compromised by partisanship.71 Another concern is that the federal 
government has failed to aggressively exercise its enforcement authority.72 Yet another critique is 
that the reforms are not sustainable, given that there is no process to ensure that the implemented 
reforms will continue after the negotiated agreement is terminated.73 And finally, commentators 
note that the current model under § 14141 fails to encourage experimentation and information-
sharing among jurisdictions.74 
Despite the shortcomings of these legislative measures, they remain important tools in 
addressing police misconduct.75 Notwithstanding the availability of these tools, the next section 
explores the untapped potential of using the FHA to remedy widespread stop-and-frisk violations. 
II. THE FAIR HOUSING ACT: A VALUABLE SUPPLEMENTAL TOOL 
The Fair Housing Act, enacted as Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, makes it 
unlawful to, inter alia, “discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of 
sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, 
because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.”76 As a general matter, FHA 
claims may be brought under theories of both disparate treatment and disparate impact.77 Because 
this Article focuses on those instances where intentional discrimination cannot be proven, only the 
latter theory is relevant here. Despite the uniform acceptance of disparate impact theory under the 
FHA among the federal appellate courts presented with the issue (eleven in all),78 several different 
                                                                
police line officers and spouses, City officials, white citizens, other minorities and youth.” See Collaborative Agreement, In 
re Cincinnati Policing, No. C-1-99-317, 2001 WL 1842470, at ¶ 4 (S.D. Ohio, Apr. 12, 2001), available at 
http://www.cincinnati-oh.gov/police/permits-auctions-references/collaborative-agreement/.  
71  Simmons, supra note 9, at 373. 
72  Id. at 375. 
73  Id. at 376. 
74  Id.  
75  See Walker & Macdonald, supra note 9, at 501 (“Experts generally agree that no single reform strategy has 
been completely effective, or is likely to be effective, in establishing consistently high standards of professional conduct.”). 
76  42 U.S.C.A. § 3604(b) (2013). 
77  See, e.g., Comm. Concerning Cmty. Improvement v. City of Modesto, 583 F.3d 690, 711 (9th Cir. 2009); 
Hack v. President of Yale Coll., 237 F.3d 81, 88 (2d Cir. 2000). 
78  Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, Final Rule [hereinafter “FHA 
Implementation Rule”], 78 Fed. Reg. 11,460, 11,462 (Feb. 15, 2013) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100). See, e.g., Graoch 
Assocs. v. Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro. Human Relations Comm’n, 508 F.3d 366, 374 (6th Cir. 2007); Reinhart v. 
Lincoln Cnty., 482 F.3d 1225, 1229 (10th Cir. 2007); Hallmark Developers, Inc. v. Fulton Cnty., 466 F.3d 1276, 1286 (11th 
Cir. 2006); Charleston Hous. Auth. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 419 F.3d 729, 740-41 (8th Cir. 2005); Langlois v. Abington 
Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 43, 49-50 (1st Cir. 2000); Simms v. First Gibraltar Bank, 83 F.3d 1546, 1555 (5th Cir. 1996); Jackson 
v. Okaloosa Cnty., 21 F.3d 1531, 1543 (11th Cir. 1994); Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467, 484 (9th Cir. 1988); Huntington 
Branch Nat’l Assoc. for the Advancement of Colored People v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 937-38 (2d Cir. 1998), 
aff’d, 488 U.S. 15 (1988) (per curiam); Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 148 (3d Cir. 1977); Betsey v. Turtle 
Creek Assocs., 736 F.2d 983, 987-89 & n.3 (4th Cir. 1984); Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 
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frameworks have been applied to claims proceeding under that theory over the past four decades.79 
The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”), which is charged with 
interpreting and enforcing the FHA, has always used a three-step burden-shifting approach.80 Under 
this approach, the plaintiff must make a prima facie showing “that the challenged practice caused 
or predictably will cause a discriminatory effect.”81 A practice is defined to have a discriminatory 
effect when it “actually or predictably results in disparate impact on a group of persons or creates, 
increases, reinforces, or perpetuates segregated housing patterns because of race, color, religion, 
sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin.”82 If the plaintiff makes this prima facie showing, 
then the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to prove that “the challenged practice is necessary 
to achieve one or more substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests of the respondent or 
defendant.”83 If the defendant satisfies its burden, then the plaintiff must demonstrate that “the 
substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests supporting the challenged practice could be 
served by another practice that has a less discriminatory effect.”84 
A. The Current Status of the Disparate Impact Theory under the FHA 
The Supreme Court questioned this “quiet, if muddled, landscape”85 in 2011 by granting 
certiorari in Magner v. Gallagher86 to address two questions: (1) whether disparate impact claims 
are cognizable under the FHA; and (2) if such claims are cognizable, which test should be used to 
analyze them.87 Following “pressure from civil rights and housing advocates nationwide” and 
                                                                
1283, 1290-91 (7th Cir. 1977); United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1184-86 (8th Cir. 1974). 
79  The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”), along with many federal courts of 
appeal, has used a three-step burden-shifting approach. FHA Implementation Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. at 11,462; see, e.g., 
Charleston, 419 F.3d at 740-42; Langlois, 207 F.3d at 49-50; Huntington Branch, 844 F.2d at 939. One federal appellate 
court applies a multi-factor balancing test. See Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 558 F.2d at 1290. Other appellate courts apply a 
hybrid between the two. See Graoch, 508 F.3d at 373; Mountain Side Mobile Estates v. Sec’y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 56 
F.3d 1243, 1252, 1254 (10th Cir. 1995). And one court applies different tests for public and private defendants. See Betsey, 
736 F.2d at 989 n.5. 
80  FHA Implementation Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. at 11,462. 
81  24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(1) (2013). 
82  Id. § 100.500(a). 
83  Id. § 100.500(c). 
84  Id. All but one of the federal appellate courts that rely on the burden-shifting approach place the burden on 
the plaintiff to prove that a less discriminatory alternative exists. Compare Mount Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. 
Twp. of Mount Holly, 658 F.3d 375, 382 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. dismissed, 134 S.Ct. 636 (2013), Gallagher v. Magner, 619 
F.3d 823, 834 (8th Cir. 2010), Graoch, 508 F.3d at 373-74, and Mountain Side Mobile Estates, 56 F.3d at 1254 (all placing 
the burden of demonstrating less discriminatory alternative on plaintiff), with Huntington Branch, 844 F.2d at 939 (placing 
the burden on the defendant to demonstrate that no less discriminatory alternative exists). 
85  Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Is Disparate Impact Having Any Impact? An Appellate Analysis of Forty Years of 
Disparate Impact Claims Under the Fair Housing Act, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 357, 374 (2013). 
86  132 S. Ct. 548 (2011). 
87  Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 38, Magner v. Gallagher, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011) (No. 10-1032), 2011 U.S. 
S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2812. For a thorough analysis of the issues presented by Magner, see Seicshnaydre, supra note 85, at 
357-64. 
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fearing that “a Supreme Court showdown with the landlords could provide a Pyrrhic victory . . . 
that weakens the notion of ‘disparate impact’ in civil rights enforcement,” the city withdrew their 
petition shortly before oral argument.88 Among those who also expressed concern was former U.S. 
Senator and FHA sponsor, Walter Mondale, who stated that if the Supreme Court were to find the 
disparate impact test under the FHA unconstitutional, “[t]hat would largely de-fang the Fair 
Housing Act.”89 
Little more than a year after the dismissal of the writ of certiorari in Magner, the Supreme 
Court again granted certiorari to address the validity of disparate impact claims under the FHA, this 
time in Township of Mt. Holly v. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc.90 The Court limited 
review to only one of the questions presented by the petition: “Are disparate impact claims 
cognizable under the Fair Housing Act?”91 As with Magner, however, the parties settled prior to 
oral argument,92 thereby leaving the disparate impact theory under the FHA intact. 
B. Police Services: A Municipal Service under the FHA 
As stated previously, the Fair Housing Act, in § 3604(b), prohibits discrimination in the 
provision of services or facilities in connection with the sale or rental of a dwelling because of 
race.93 Although some may perceive the scope of the FHA to be limited to prohibiting 
discrimination in the actual sale or rental of a dwelling (for example, refusing to rent an apartment 
to a black applicant), such a perception narrowly construes the language and purpose of the FHA.94 
Recognizing this, some courts have held that the FHA covers post-acquisition conduct—
discrimination that occurs after an individual acquires housing.95 For this reason, discrimination in 
                                                                
88  Kevin Diaz, St. Paul Yanks Housing Fight from High Court, STAR TRIBUNE, Feb. 11, 2012, available at 
http://www.startribune.com/politics/national/139138084.html; see Magner v. Gallagher, 132 S. Ct. 1306 (2012). 
89  Diaz, supra note 88. 
90  Twp. of Mt. Holly v. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2824 (2013). For a thorough 
analysis of the issues presented by Mt. Holly, see Seicshnaydre, supra note 85, at 364-67. 
91  Twp. of Mt. Holly v. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2824 (2013); Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari, Twp. of Mount Holly v. Mount Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc., 2012 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2623 
(June 11, 2012) (No. 11-1507).  
92  Adam Liptak, Fair-Housing Case Is Settled Before It Reaches Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2013, 
at A18. Despite concern that some members of the Supreme Court considered Mount Holly an opportunity for framing 
disparate impact theory in an undesirable way, some commentators have expressed optimism that disparate impact claims 
under the FHA will survive any equal protection arguments. See Seicshnaydre, supra note 85, at 398-406 & n.280; see also 
Eric W.M. Bain, Note, Another Missed Opportunity to Fix Discrimination in Discrimination Law, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. 
REV. 1434, 1459-68 (2012) (explaining the reasons the Supreme Court should recognize the validity of disparate impact 
under the FHA); see also Seicshnaydre, supra note 85, at 414 (“Of course, if the Court eliminates FHA disparate impact 
claims, plaintiffs may be able to assert them under state and local laws.”). 
93  Southend Neighborhood Improvement Ass’n v. Cnty. of St. Clair, 743 F.2d 1207, 1210 (7th Cir. 1984) 
(“[Section 3604(b) applies to services generally provided by governmental units such as police . . . protection . . . .”). 
94  See Benjamin A. Schepis, Making the Fair Housing Act More Fair: Permitting Section 3604(b) to Provide 
Relief for Post-Occupancy Discrimination in the Provision of Municipal Services—A Historical View, 41 U. TOL. L. REV. 
411, 416-24 (2010). 
95  The federal courts of appeal are currently split as to whether the FHA covers post-acquisition conduct. 
According to commentators, the majority of courts favor permitting § 3604(b) claims alleging the discriminatory provision 
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the provision of law enforcement services, even after an individual has purchased or rented her 
dwelling, falls within the FHA’s coverage. 
i. The Provision of Inadequate Police Services 
Courts have recognized the viability of a § 3604(b) claim for a municipality’s failure to 
provide minority neighborhoods with adequate police services.96 In Committee Concerning 
Community Improvement v. City of Modesto, for example, residents of predominantly Latino 
neighborhoods alleged, inter alia, that the County failed to provide them with adequate municipal 
services.97 Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the dispatch time (the time lapse between a call 
to 911 and the dispatch of an officer) and the total response time (the time lapse between a 911 call 
and the arrival of an officer on scene, including dispatch time) of law-enforcement and emergency 
response personnel were slower in predominantly Latino neighborhoods than in predominantly 
white neighborhoods.98 The difference in dispatch time between the majority Latino neighborhoods 
and majority white neighborhoods was, at a minimum, almost two minutes; the difference in 
response was, at a minimum, almost one minute.99 The County offered no reason why dispatch 
times were different between neighborhoods.100 Instead, the County argued that response time was 
                                                                
of municipal services to residents, but a significant number do not. See ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION: 
LAW AND LITIGATION § 14:3 (2013); see generally Schepis, supra note 94 (recognizing the two general approaches of 
federal courts in their interpretation of § 3604(b)). Compare Comm. Concerning Cmty. Improvement v. City of Modesto, 
583 F.3d 690, 713-15 (9th Cir. 2009), Davis v. City of New York, 902 F. Supp. 2d 405, 435-37 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), Hidden 
Vill., LLC v. City of Lakewood, 867 F. Supp. 2d 920, 934-38 (N.D. Ohio 2012), Richards v. Bono, No. 5:04-cv-484-Oc-
10GRJ, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43585, at *7-20 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 26, 2005), United States v. Koch, 352 F. Supp. 2d 970, 972-
979 (D. Neb. 2004), Lopez v. City of Dallas, No. 3:03-CV-2223-M, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18220, at *24-27 (N.D. Tex. 
Sept. 9, 2004), and Campbell v. City of Berwyn, 815 F. Supp. 1138, 1143-44 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (all permitting § 3604(b) 
claims alleging the discriminatory provision of municipal services to residents) with Cox v. City of Dallas, 430 F.3d 734, 
745-746 (5th Cir. 2005), and Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass’n, 388 F.3d 327, 328-30 (7th 
Cir. 2004) (barring § 3604(b) claims alleging the discriminatory provision of municipal services to residents). But see Bloch 
v. Frischholz, 587 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 2009) (revisiting Halprin, 388 F.3d 327, and discussing post-acquisition claims). Some 
courts have found the distinction between “sale” and “rental” to be crucial in determining whether post-acquisition 
discrimination is protected by § 3604(b). See, e.g., Richards, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43585, at *11; Jackson v. Comberg, 
No. 8:05-cv-1713-T-24TMAP, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66405, at *11 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 22, 2006) (following the reasoning in 
Richards). See also Mary Pennisi, Note, A Herculean Leap for the Hard Case of Post-Acquisition Claims: Interpreting Fair 
Housing Act Section 3604(b) After Modesto, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1083, 1139-46 (2010) (suggesting that the Supreme 
Court should eliminate the distinction between pre- and post-acquisition discrimination and permit plaintiffs to raise claims 
under § 3604(b) for discrimination that occurs at any time in the acquisition process). 
96  See Comm. Concerning Cmty. Improvement, 583 F.3d at 707-709 (residents of predominantly Latino 
neighborhoods alleged, inter alia, that the dispatch time and the total response time of law enforcement personnel were 
slower in predominantly Latino islands than in predominantly white islands); Campbell, 815 F. Supp. at 44 (African-
American plaintiffs alleged that the superintendent of police terminated police protection of their home from racially 
motivated attacks based on their race).  
97  583 F.3d at 696. 
98  Id. at 699. 
99  Id. at 708.  
100  Id. 
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the most important measure to the person waiting for the police to arrive.101 The Ninth Circuit found 
that this argument had weight, but disagreed that “as a matter of law, a difference of one minute 
can be characterized as not making a ‘meaningful difference’ when one is waiting at one’s home 
for law-enforcement or emergency personnel to arrive.”102 The Ninth Circuit, therefore, reversed 
the grant of summary judgment to the County on the plaintiffs’ FHA claims regarding the 
discriminatory provision of law enforcement services.103 The parties subsequently settled the 
case.104 
ii. The Provision of Overly Aggressive Police Services 
Albeit arguably counterintuitive, the zealous provision of municipal services to minority 
neighborhoods may also violate the FHA. For this reason, courts have recognized the viability of a 
§ 3604(b) claim for a city’s provision of more aggressive police services to minority 
neighborhoods.105 
In Doe v. County of Kankakee, residents of a predominantly African American complex 
alleged, inter alia, discrimination in rental housing under § 3604(b) by the city of Kankakee, the 
county of Kankakee, and the Kankakee Area Metropolitan Enforcement Group (“KAMEG”)106 for 
their aggressive policing tactics.107 The stated goal of KAMEG was to combat the illegal drug trade 
and other crimes occurring in local jurisdictions “through policy and procedure, us[ing] aggressive 
methods of law enforcement, including the prohibition of loitering for lawful purposes, conducting 
arrests without probable cause or warrant, random searches, and excessive force in making 
arrests.”108 KAMEG employed these practices in low-income housing throughout the area, 
including the plaintiffs’ complex.109 The city entered into an agreement with the owner of the 
                                                                
101  Id. 
102  Id. at 709.  
103  Id. Although the Ninth Circuit examined the racially disparate statistics in its equal protection analysis, 
the Court reinstated the plaintiffs’ FHA claims regarding the provision of law enforcement services, observing that the 
plaintiffs’ “factual averments supporting the alleged violations of the FHA are largely the same as the allegations supporting 
plaintiffs’ claims that their rights to equal protection were violated by defendants’ actions with regard to municipal services,” 
including “an ongoing discriminatory failure to provide adequate law enforcement protection and emergency services . . . .” 
Id. at 714-15 & n.15. 
104  See Comm. Concerning Cmty. Improvement v. City of Modesto, No. Civ. F-04-6121 LJO DLB (E.D. Cal. 
June 30, 2011), Dkt. No. 559. 
105  See Doe v. County of Kankakee, No. 03 C 8786, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12740 at *14-17 (N.D. Ill. July 
6, 2004) (discussing plaintiffs’ allegation, inter alia, that the city, the county, and the joint venture of municipalities 
selectively applied aggressive law enforcement tactics to the detriment of the complex’s predominantly African American 
residents); cf. Inland Mediation Bd. v. City of Pomona, 158 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (discussing plaintiffs’ 
allegation, inter alia, that the city sponsored a landlord screening service limited only to landlords in an area comprised of 
mostly minority residents and that the city provided different services to this area in violation of § 3604(a)). 
106  Doe, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12740, at *4 (describing KAMEG as “a joint venture of municipalities . . . 
[which] is composed of members of law enforcement from both the City and County.”).  
107  Id. at *2-*3. 
108  Id. at *5.  
109  Id.  
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complex and the management firm for the complex giving authority to the city to control any non-
residents found in the common areas of the complex.110 
The Doe plaintiffs alleged that the county, by stringently enforcing the agreement through 
KAMEG, violated § 3604(b) by discouraging the use of the complex’s common areas.111 The 
plaintiffs further alleged that the city, the county, and KAMEG applied these law enforcement 
tactics selectively and based on race, color, and national origin.112 Finding that the plaintiffs 
sufficiently alleged a cause of action under § 3604(b), the court denied the county’s motion to 
dismiss on this claim.113 The parties subsequently settled the case.114 
Application of § 3604(b) to the Overly Aggressive Use of Stop-and-Frisk in Minority 
Neighborhoods 
Though the issue has not been fully litigated,115 relying on § 3604(b) of the FHA to combat 
the aggressive use of stop-and-frisk practices in minority neighborhoods deserves some attention, 
particularly when the DOJ has failed to act pursuant to its “pattern or practice” authority. To do so, 
a minority resident-plaintiff, with the assistance of an expert,116 would have to demonstrate that the 
practices of her local police department disproportionately affect minority residents, and that police 
officers engage in more stop-and-frisk activity in her minority neighborhood than in non-minority 
neighborhoods.117 Such an effort would require documentation measuring the level of police 
enforcement—namely the practice of stop-and-frisk. If the resident meets her burden, which she is 
likely to do given that aggressive law enforcement tactics tend to be concentrated “in the ‘hood,”118 
then the local police department would have the burden to prove that its stop-and-frisk practices are 
                                                                
110  Id. at *6.  
111  Id. at *15. 
112  Id. 
113  Id. at *15-*16. 
114  See Doe v. County of Kankakee, No. 1:03-cv-08786, (N.D. Ill. Jan. 12, 2005), Dkt No. 49. 
115  See, e.g., Complaint at ¶¶ 202-13, 244-250, Davis v. City of New York, 902 F.Supp.2d 405 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 
28, 2010) (No. 10 Civ. 0699 (SAS)) (pleading a disparate impact claim under the FHA for the NYPD’s discriminatory stop-
and-frisk practices in New York City Housing Authority buildings), withdrawn, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45601 (plaintiffs 
consented to the dismissal of their FHA disparate impact claim); Complaint at ¶¶ 186-96, 205, Ligon v. City of New York, 
925 F.Supp.2d 478 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2012) (pleading a disparate impact claim under the FHA for the NYPD’s 
discriminatory stop-and-frisk practices in private residential buildings enrolled in the Trespass Affidavit Program). 
116  See Seicshnaydre, supra note 85, at 383 (noting the importance of having an expert to develop the 
statistical analysis necessary to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact); see, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan et al., Race and 
Selective Enforcement in Public Housing, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES 697 (2012) (comparing trespass and other 
enforcement activities in New York City Housing Authority developments with the same parameters of enforcement in 
similarly situated areas to determine if public housing in New York is targeted for trespass enforcement). But cf. Susan D. 
Carle, A Social Movement History of Title VII Disparate Impact Analysis, 63 FLA. L. REV. 251, 257 (2011) (“It is today very 
rare for plaintiffs other than highly sophisticated and well-funded litigants, such as the U.S. Department of Justice, to prevail 
under Title VII on a disparate impact theory.”). 
117  In New York City, for example, police officers are required to complete a UF-250 form, also known as a 
“Stop, Question and Frisk Report Worksheet,” after each Terry stop. Floyd, 959 F.Supp.2d at 572. Each side of the form 
contains checkboxes and fields in which officers are required to indicate the nature of the stop, the location of the stop, and 
the circumstances leading to and justifying the stop. Id. & app. A. 
118  ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 121 (“[W]hen police go looking for drugs, they look in the ’hood. Tactics 
that would be political suicide in an upscale white suburb are not even newsworthy in poor black and brown communities.”). 
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necessary to “achieve one or more substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests”119—most 
likely combating high crime.120 Put another way, the local police department must demonstrate that 
its level of enforcement activities in minority neighborhoods can be explained by crime conditions 
in those neighborhoods. The department engaging in racially discriminatory behavior likely would 
not be able to meet this burden; instead, expert analysis would reveal that, even after controlling for 
crime, law enforcement activities in minority neighborhoods remain racially skewed.121 If the police 
department meets its burden of demonstrating that high crime in minority neighborhoods justifies 
its practices, however, then the resident must prove that these interests can be served by another 
practice that has a less discriminatory effect.122 
Challenging stop-and-frisk practices by relying on an FHA disparate impact theory has 
practical significance.123 First, unlike the DOJ’s “pattern or practice” authority under § 14141, the 
FHA provides a private right of action, meaning that individual plaintiffs can sue without waiting 
for the federal government to act. Challenges to the stop-and-frisk practices of police departments, 
therefore, would not be compromised by partisan politics, nor would they depend on the resources 
of a federal agency.124 Second, unlike an Equal Protection claim under § 1983, an FHA claim for 
the provision of overly aggressive municipal services can be premised on an impact theory, rather 
than being constrained to proving intent.125 Third, the threat of FHA liability may encourage 
municipalities and their police departments to adopt best practices.126 Finally, an FHA claim 
                                                                
119  24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(2) (2014). 
120  See, e.g., Fagan, supra note 116, at 703 (noting that, in response to a legal challenge, the police could 
argue that the higher crime rates in public housing motivated the higher rate of sweeps). 
121  See id. at 698, 718-22 (demonstrating that the level of trespass enforcement in public housing cannot be 
explained by crime); Floyd, 959 F.Supp.2d at 560-62; NY ATTORNEY GENERAL 1999 STOP & FRISK REPORT, supra note 7, 
at 119 (noting that, even when crime was accounted for statistically, racial minorities were stopped at a higher rate than 
whites). 
122  24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(3) (2014). See, e.g., Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Crime Mapping and the Fourth 
Amendment: Redrawing “High-Crime Areas,” 63 HASTINGS L.J. 179, 221-25 (2011) (proposing a more “particularized 
approach” to deploying officers in “high-crime areas” through the use of mapping technology so as to “respect[] the liberty 
of individuals living in high-crime neighborhoods and minimize[] the reputational damage done by an overbroad 
generalization”); Fagan, supra note 116, at 720-21 (finding that the study’s results suggest that “race and ethnicity play an 
important role in the conduct of enforcement in public housing, a role that is present after controlling for other policy-
relevant factors [such as crime] and social conditions, as well as for the allocation of police resources and the intensity of 
policing tactics”). 
123  See Robert G. Schwemm, The Fair Housing Act After 40 Years: Continuing the Mission to Eliminate 
Housing Discrimination and Segregation, 41 IND. L. REV. 717, 789-90 (2008) (observing that the value of FHA coverage 
would be in those cases where its procedures or relief are more favorable—e.g., broader standing to sue; agency authority 
to enforce; different statutes of limitations; a well-established “continuing violation theory”; and potential authorization of 
punitive damage awards). But see Seicshnaydre, supra note 85 (finding that an analysis of forty years of appellate case law 
demonstrates that courts have a narrow view of FHA disparate impact theory). 
124  See Simmons, supra note 9, at 373, 375. 
125  See Schwemm, supra note 123, at 789-90; see also Seicshnaydre, supra note 85, at 414 (“[T]he disparate 
treatment standard by itself is an insufficient method of proof to capture the policies and procedures used to maintain racial 
segregation in the United States”). 
126  See Brief of the Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Respondents at 21-24, Twp. of Mt. Holly v. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2824 (Oct. 28, 2013); cf. 
Walker & Macdonald, supra note 9, at 495 (noting that some scholars have argued that the fear of tort litigation, as opposed 
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reinforces the notion that place matters. Blacks “remain the most racially segregated population in 
the nation,”127 followed by Latinos.128 These populations are “segregated not just from whites but 
also from opportunities that are critical to the quality of life, stability, and advancement. Where one 
lives determines one’s connection to jobs, high-performing neighborhood schools, green space, 
quality retail stores, fresh foods, and safety.”129 Living in a racially segregated building or 
neighborhood forces residents of color to pay a price—overzealous policing—that those living 
elsewhere do not.130 When the level of policing is not proportional to the relevant crime conditions, 
or when criminality occurs in significant numbers in non-minority areas and yet does not receive 
law enforcement attention, the FHA is available to ensure that the price minority residents pay is 
not higher than it should be. 
III. CONCLUSION 
As the Supreme Court recognized in Terry forty-five years ago, “it is simply fantastic to 
urge that [a frisk] performed in public by a policeman while the citizen stands helpless, perhaps 
facing a wall with his hands raised, is a ‘petty indignity.’”131 This has not changed. If anything, it 
is more true today, as local police departments, by increasingly relying on stop-and-frisk tactics in 
minority communities, have demonstrated that place matters. Where residents live determines the 
nature of their relationship with the police. For minority residents, that relationship is often 
corrosive, built on the false premise that the police are present to protect them when the reality is 
the opposite: they are there to oppress and harass them in a racialized manner. The federal 
legislative measures typically relied on to remedy this kind of police misconduct have fallen short 
of effectuating institutional reform. Challenging a police department’s discriminatory provision of 
police services to minority neighborhoods by bringing disparate impact claims under the Fair 
Housing Act represents a viable supplement. 
 
                                                                
to actual lawsuits, has been a major stimulus to police reform since the mid-1970s). 
127  LEADERSHIP LEARNING COMMUNITY, LEADERSHIP & RACE: HOW TO DEVELOP AND SUPPORT 
LEADERSHIP THAT CONTRIBUTES TO RACIAL JUSTICE [hereinafter “LEADERSHIP & RACE REPORT”] 6 (2010), available at 
http://leadershiplearning.org/system/files/Leadership%20and%20Race%20FINAL_Electronic_072010.pdf. 
128  JOHN R. LOGAN, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL: THE NEIGHBORHOOD GAP FOR BLACKS, HISPANICS AND 
ASIANS IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA 1, 4, 15-16 (2011), available at http://www.s4.brown.edu 
/us2010/Data/Report/report0727.pdf; see also JOHN R. LOGAN & WENQUAN ZHANG, GLOBAL NEIGHBORHOODS; NEW 
EVIDENCE FROM CENSUS 2010, at 1 (2011) (“About half the black population and forty percent of Hispanics still live in 
neighborhoods without a white presence.”), http://www.s4.brown.edu/us2010/Data/Report/globalfinal2.pdf; see also 
POVERTY & RACE RESEARCH ACTION COUNSEL & NATIONAL FAIR HOUSING ALLIANCE, RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION AND 
HOUSING DISCRIMINATION IN THE UNITED STATES: VIOLATIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE 
ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, at i (2008), available at 
http://www.prrac.org/pdf/FinalCERDHousingDiscriminationReport.pdf (“Residential segregation is an insidious and 
persistent fact of American life. Discrimination on the basis of race, while on the decline according to some statistics, 
continues to pervade nearly every aspect of the housing market in the United States.”).  
129  LEADERSHIP & RACE REPORT, supra note 127, at 6. 
130  See ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 129 (observing that even seemingly race-neutral factors, such as 
location, for the concentration of law enforcement resources in ghetto communities operate in a discriminatory fashion). 
131  392 U.S. at 14. 
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